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Abstract 
 
 
This paper explores the challenges of and the explanations for multi-agency partnerships 
in crime reduction work in the United Kingdom and Canada.  It begins by reviewing the 
rise of crime reduction partnerships in the United Kingdom with a focus on legislation, 
programs, and strategies with partners.  Partnerships at the local level, information 
sharing, accountability, roles and responsibilities, and value conflicts and power 
differentials in partnerships are additional themes in the paper.  The City of Surrey Crime 
Reduction Strategy is provided as a Canadian example of multi-agency partnerships.  An 
explanation for the rise of partnership work is also outlined in the paper.  The differences 
in government structure, legislation, and delivery of a crime reduction model, 
accountability systems, blurring boundaries, and the offloading of responsibilities are 
discussed and analysed.  The paper concludes by providing recommendations for further 
crime reduction and partnership studies. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
The emergence of crime reduction partnerships in the United Kingdom and the 
recent development of similar multi-agency partnerships in Surrey, British Columbia will 
be the focus of this paper.  Crime reduction in the United Kingdom is based on 
collaboration and commitment between agency leaders, city officials, and police at the 
local level.  In the United Kingdom crime reduction model targets are identified, partners 
are held accountable, and strategies are evaluated.  The aim of this comprehensive 
approach is to give some of the work of preventing and reducing crime a new focus 
across a wide range of local agency services.  Crime reduction is a matter of putting 
crime and disorder considerations at the center of decision making for a wider range of 
agency leaders who will work in partnership with police (Rogers, 2006; United Kingdom 
Government Crime Reduction, 2006).   
Essentially, the crime reduction model in the United Kingdom is made up of the 
following components:  drug treatment, prolific offenders, youth programs, evidence-
based research, partnerships, and integrated justice.  The crime reduction model is 
broader in that it also encompasses education, employment, housing, offender 
management, and reintegration.  Examples of crime reduction include a sophisticated 
drug strategy program, a prolific offender strategy, and certain crime prevention 
strategies.  Multi-agency coordination in these strategies is needed in order to effectively 
and efficiently deal with crime and individuals involved in the crime cycle (Rogers, 2006; 
United Kingdom Government Crime Reduction, 2006).   
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If crime reduction continues to be implemented in Canada, it may require a 
fundamental shift within the Criminal Justice System, particularly at the local levels, and 
could eventually be viewed as a new paradigm that will require major changes in the way 
agencies and governments manage crime reduction.  However, it is apparent from the 
disjointed approach that currently exists between agencies, such as health, education, 
corrections, courts, and police, that a change in governance is necessary (City of Surrey, 
2007a).     
This paper will be organized into five chapters consisting of an introduction, 
review of the literature, explanations for governance through partnerships, discussion and 
analysis of the literature, and conclusion.  Chapter 2 reviews the literature on local 
partnerships and multi-agency work in the United Kingdom and Canada.  It consists of 
the history and development of crime reduction in the United Kingdom and the 
challenges for partnership work, including:  (1) information and resource sharing in 
partnerships, (2) accountability in partnerships, (3) partnerships at the local level, (4) 
roles and responsibilities in partnerships, and (5) value conflicts and power differentials 
in partnerships.  Canada’s partnership approach, specifically through the example of City 
of Surrey’s Crime Reduction Strategy, will be included in the literature review. 
Chapter 3 explains the emergence of partnerships and draws on the literature 
about governance strategies, community mobilization, and partnerships in the United 
Kingdom and Canada.  The importance of inter-agency and multi-agency cooperation, 
key public partners, service providers, community involvement, and the private sector 
will also be included in this chapter.   
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Chapter 4 examines the importance of multi-agency cooperation in implementing 
crime reduction strategies as well as the extent to which the United Kingdom crime 
reduction model of partnerships can be applied at the local level in a Canadian context.  
Additional areas of discussion include the practicality of the current governance and 
responsibilization strategies in Canada and whether they need to be challenged and 
improved.  Differences between the United Kingdom and Canada in legislation, 
government structures, and implementation and delivery will also be discussed.  Chapter 
5 brings together a summary of findings and recommendations and proposals for future 
research.   
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature 
 
 
Prior to discussing the implementation of crime reduction strategies in the form of 
multi-agency partnerships in Canada, it is important to examine closely the studies and 
work previously conducted by others in the area of crime reduction partnerships.  
Therefore, the focus in this chapter will be on the partnership approaches being used in 
the United Kingdom.  The below literature review is divided into sections which are 
intended to inform the reader about the theories and positions in the field of crime 
reduction with a focus on multi-agency partnership work. 
Crime Reduction Partnerships in the United Kingdom 
 
There are several key pieces of legislation and government policies as well as 
publications that influenced crime reduction partnerships in the United Kingdom (U.K.), 
prior to the enactment of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA).  While a full 
discussion on the U.K. policy context is not possible in this paper, the most significant 
pieces relating to multi-agency partnerships will be examined. 
a. Legislation and Policies for Partnerships 
 
    The Home Office Crime Reduction Centre (2003) is useful in summarizing the 
steps that led up to the Crime and Disorder Act.  Partnership work has been officially 
advocated in the U.K. since the 1984 inter-departmental circular which encouraged the 
organization of multi-agency groups at the local level to tackle crime.  In 1988 the Safer 
Cities program started and focused on specific problems and multi-agency projects in 
inner cities.  In 1990 another circular as well as a booklet emphasizing partnerships in 
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crime prevention was issued.  In 1991, the Morgan Report said that crime prevention 
work should be coordinated at the local level.  According to the Morgan Report, 
structure, leadership, information, identity, durability, and resources were the six main 
elements that needed to be addressed along with providing the local authorities with 
statutory duty.  The Morgan report presented the shift in language from ‘crime 
prevention’ to ‘crime and disorder reduction’ (Hughes and Gilling, 2004). 
The significance of the Morgan Report is commonly referred to throughout the 
literature even though the Conservative government at the time did not implement the 
recommendations from the report (Crawford, 1999; Home Office Crime Reduction 
Centre, 2003; Hughes and Edwards, 2005; Hughes and Gilling, 2004; Rogers, 2006).  
Instead, the recommendations of the Morgan Report were put forward in 1997 by the 
Labour government.  The next significant step towards crime reduction and the 
partnership approach took place in 1998 with the Crime and Disorder Act (CDA).  The 
CDA took into account the recommendations of the Morgan Report regarding local 
statutory responsibility along with multi-agency partnerships and audits (Home Office 
Crime Reduction Centre, 2003; Rogers, 2006).   
The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 created a framework for agencies to work 
together on locally-agreed targets.  The ‘responsible authorities’ referred to in the CDA 
consist of the local government and the police.  Health Services, known as Primary Care 
Trust in England, and Fire Services have since been added as responsible authorities 
when the CDA was amended by the Police Reform Act 2002 (Rogers, 2006).  In 
partnership, these authorities have the responsibility for creating, implementing, and 
monitoring a crime reduction strategy.  The CDA also states that any other state- led 
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person or authority has the duty to cooperate with these responsible authority partners in 
reducing crime.  The CDA has had the impact of tying the government bodies together 
under the law (Rogers, 2006). 
b. The Development of Partnerships 
 
As a result of the CDA, three-hundred-and-seventy-six Crime and Disorder 
Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) were created in England and Wales.  The statutory 
partnerships in Wales were known as Community Safety Partnerships, but they were 
essentially the same as CDRPs in England.  While the CDRPs were funded by the Home 
Office, they gave the lead responsibility for crime and disorder reduction to the police 
and local authorities which were set up in geographical areas and were considered to be 
the local government (Home Office Crime Reduction Centre, 2003).   
The CDRPs include investments in initiatives to improve prevention, sentencing, 
target hardening, work with offenders, and to tackle high volume crime.  The Crime and 
Disorder Act created new powers, some of which are:  anti-social behaviour orders, 
reparation orders, parenting orders, local curfew schemes, removal of truants, drug 
treatment and testing orders, and information sharing between agencies (Home Office 
Crime Reduction Centre, 2003; Rogers, 2006).  The structure of most CDRPs consist of a 
CDRP tasking, coordinating, and commissioning group with several specific task forces 
branching off of it to assist the process, such as street robberies working group, car 
crimes working group, and domestic burglary working group.  Rogers explains that the 
tasking group “oversees the implementation of the strategic vision, making the aims and 
objectives a reality by liaising with the different task groups to ensure that the 
partnership’s targets are attained” (2006:42).  They adopt a joint problem solving 
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approach to tackling issues, such as drug misuse.  In addition, community consultation is 
a requirement for the CDRPs as this information-sharing process helps the partnerships 
decide what priorities will guide their strategy (Rogers, 2006). 
The CDA resulted in the formation of several other partnerships and boards most 
of which are multi-agency in order to meet the crime reduction objectives of the Home 
Office.  While this list is not inclusive, some of these partnerships include Local Strategic 
Partnerships (LSPs), Local Criminal Justice Boards (LCJBs), Youth Justice Board (YJB), 
Youth Offending Teams (YOTs), Drug Action Teams (DATs), and Criminal Justice 
Intervention Teams (CJITs) (Rogers, 2006).  These partnerships and boards will be 
summarized below in their related context. 
A Local Strategic Partnership (LSP) is a single non-statutory, multi-agency body 
which matches local authority boundaries.  Essentially, the role of the LSPs are 
overarching local coordination between the private, community, and voluntary sectors; 
delivering improved services and meeting government targets; and developing and 
delivering a community strategy and Local Neighbourhood Renewal Strategies (Homel, 
Nutley, Webb, & Tilley, 2004b). 
 Local Criminal Justice Boards (LCJBs) were set up in 2003 and have a current 
count of forty-three boards across England.  They are responsible for the justice system at 
the local level because they (1) increase offences brought to justice, (2) reduce ineffective 
trials, (3) improve timeliness in courts, (4) enforce fines, and (5) meet the young offender 
pledge.  The young offender pledge is accelerating time from arrest to sentence for 
persistent young offenders (United Kingdom Government Crime Reduction, 2006). 
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The Youth Justice Board (YJB) was established by the Crime and Disorder Act.  
The YJB is a Home Office sponsored non-departmental public body which has the task of 
monitoring and coordinating the delivery of youth justice services for young people.  
Youth Offending Teams (YOTS) were also formed under the CDA.  YOTS are multi-
agency groups implementing and coordinating youth justice services at the local level. 
The Youth Justice Board and anyone working in the youth justice system have a statutory 
duty of preventing offending by youth (Chapman and Niven, 2000).     
Drug Action Teams (DATs) are integrated with CDRPs and are responsible for 
the delivery of the drug strategy locally by commissioning services, monitoring progress, 
and communicating with stakeholders.  Drug treatment services are often managed 
through a Drug Action Team partnership that provides treatment and other services for 
offenders with drug problems.  Essentially, the DATs deliver on the ground treatment, 
assessments, and referrals (Millie and Erol, 2006). 
The Home Office (2006) describes the Drug Interventions Program (DIP) as the 
key element of the strategy to tackle drug-related crime.  It aims to prevent crime through 
early interventions as well as reduce crime levels by engaging the most problematic and 
prolific offenders.  It offers offenders whose crimes are drug-related the support they 
need to break the cycle of drug misuse, offending behaviour, and custody.   
The Drugs Act aims to increase the effectiveness of the DIP by getting more 
offenders into treatment as there is clear evidence that treatment works.  For every one 
pound spent on treatment, at least 9.50 pounds is saved in criminal justice and health 
costs (Rogers, 2006).  If tested positive in DIP, an offender is legally required to see a 
drugs worker, which is a huge legislative step forward.  As a result, this legislation 
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increases the number of people in treatment since drug workers see people while they are 
still in custody.  If the individual is not charged and is released, they go to a Criminal 
Justice Intervention Team (CJIT) which also has offices outside of prison.  It is important 
to note that the Drug Strategy has a workforce development strategy to ensure that there 
are sufficient ly trained drug workers to meet the demand for treatment (Millie and Erol, 
2006).     
Criminal Justice Intervention Teams (CJITs) facilitate delivery at the local level 
and are set up by the Drug Action Teams.  CJITs deliver the DIP program in local areas 
by case managing clients in treatment from the point of arrest to sentence, as well as 
during their time in prison and upon release through aftercare.  While the CJITs get them 
into treatment and deal with the services of the inter-agency work, an offender manager 
supervises the offender’s process (Home Office, 2004). 
c. Expanding the Policing Family through Partnerships 
 
Since the implementation of the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998, in addition to 
the offender manager position, policing in the U.K. has become pluralized through 
partnerships and the creation of new positions.  Hughes and Gilling claim that “this 
apparent redistribution – but actual ‘dispersal’ – of governmental competencies and 
responsibilities and the creation of new local actors – not least community safety 
managers – that play a role in crime control and safety policies is most developed in 
Britain” (2004:130).  The crime reduction or community safety manager plays an 
important role in liaising with partnerships and developing policy and strategies.  Hughes 
and Gilling describe the community safety manager as “one of the key new partnership 
experts” (2004:130).  Stockdale and Whitehead recognize that “a project manager of 
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some sort is necessary for project implementation, as this person can devote themselves 
to the project rather than do it on top of existing duties” (2003:226). 
While the community safety manager appears to be an important player in 
community safety and crime reduction, other positions have also been created in an effort 
to share the police workload.  Community safety officers are part of what Rogers (2006) 
refers to as the ‘extended policing family’.  The Police Community Support Officer 
(PCSO) patrols and uses his or her powers to resolve order maintenance problems as well 
as assist the beat manager with assistance in dealing with minor instances of public 
disorder and anti-social problems.  The purpose of these officers is “to provide visible 
and accessible uniformed presence and to engage with the public and as such they spend 
the majority of their time patrolling on foot and dealing with low-level antisocial 
behaviour” (Cooper et al., 2006; as cited in Bullock, Erol, & Tilley, 2006:128).   
Another way policing has been pluralized in the U.K. is through neighbourhood 
wardens.  They are uniformed and offer what Bullock et al. call a “semi-official 
presence” (2006:966).  They do their security patrols in residential areas, but they also 
assist with environmental improvements, liaison with landlords and tenants, look after 
void properties, respond to minor instances of anti-social behaviour, and are an 
information source for the local authorities (Bullock et al., 2006; Johnston, 2001; 
Johnston and Shearing, 2003).  In addition, Bullock et al. describe traffic wardens who 
enforce road traffic offences and issue fixed-penalty notices for certain other offences.  
Similar to neighbourhood wardens, traffic wardens supply the police with criminal and 
community intelligence through their visible presence in the community. 
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As in other countries, private security guards are used for extra services at pubs, 
concerts, and commercial property.  In the U.K., private security guards are also used for 
prisoner escort and other custody duties assisting police officers (Bullock et al., 2006).  In 
addition to the above listed control agents, Closed Circuit Televisions (CCTVs) are risk 
management techniques in the U.K. (Rose 2000).  Building on what appears to already be 
taking place in the U.K., Gilling suggests: 
The police service may find it easier to manage its new-found responsibilities 
through a division of labour which may ultimately result in two-tier policing, 
where the police service seeks to manage serious crime, as now through a 
combination of prevention and detection, while a combination of other agencies, 
including local authority patrols and other bodies, private security organizations 
and the local community itself, take on the major responsibility for minor crimes 
and disorder. (2000:137) 
 
d. Programs and Strategies for Partnerships 
 
Much of the current work taking place in the U.K. is based on the partnerships 
and positions mentioned above and initiatives that stem from the United Kingdom’s 
Crime Reduction Program (CRP) which begun in 1998 ending in 2002.  Chapman and 
Niven (2000) describe the program as being an evidence-based approach to crime 
reduction where resources are invested in initiatives that provide significant and sustained 
impacts on levels of crime.  The Crime Reduction Program covers five general themes.  
The first theme is working with families, children, and schools to prevent young people 
from becoming future offenders.  The second theme entails tackling high volume crime in 
communities.  The development of products and systems which are more resistant to 
crime is the third theme.  Lastly, more effective sentencing practices and working with 
offenders to ensure they do not re-offend are the remaining two themes (Bullock, Farrell, 
& Tilley, 2002; Chapman and Niven, 2000; Tilley, 2004). 
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A defining aspect of the U.K. crime reduction model is the Prolific and Priority 
Offender (PPO) scheme developed in 2004.  It focuses resources on and targets the small 
minority of people that commit the most crime.  The idea behind this scheme is that by 
targeting such people, this will bring down wider offending levels (Dawson, 2005; Home 
Office, 2004; Millie and Erol, 2006). 
 The PPO strategy is delivered at the local level by the police, but it is managed by 
the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships.  The PPO strategy requires multi-agency 
work between all agencies dealing with adult offenders.  Also, since a PPO is not a 
legally defined term, the locality can determine their PPOs by deciding which individuals 
in their locality cause the most crime and disorder.  The police National Intelligence 
Model (NIM) and a matrix system are used to make final decisions as to who is 
considered a PPO (Dawson, 2005; Home Office, 2004).   
The partnerships are guided by three complementary strands that were developed for 
the PPO strategy:  
1. Prevent and deter: stopping people, in particular young people, from becoming 
involved in offending behaviour and becoming prolific offenders. 
2. Catch and convict: actively tackling adults who are already prolific offenders.  
3. Rehabilitate and resettle: working with identified prolific adult offenders serving 
custodial or community-based sentences to stop re-offending by offering a range 
of support services postsentence, delivered through joint agency working. 
(Dawson, 2005; Home Office, 2004; Rogers, 2006) 
  
Worrall, Dunkerton, and Leacock explain that the last two strands are delivered as a 
whole.  The offender is given the choice to turn away from crime and rehabilitate or get 
caught and go to prison as “there is an agreed procedure for swift enforcement in the 
event of noncompliance or further offending (which requires the co-operation of courts)” 
(2001/2002:289). 
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The rehabilitate and resettle strand require the work of many agencies, including 
the police and drug treatment workers.  However, The National Probation Service and the 
Prison Service are the main partners.  The Home Office (2004c; as cited in Millie and 
Erol, 2006:696) states “the rehabilitate-and-resettle strand aimed to ensure that in every 
CDRP close partnership working is in place, with the result that seamless, effective case 
management is guaranteed for every PPO”.  This takes place through care plans and 
premium or wrap-around services.  If an offender receives any training or treatment while 
in prison, this information is passed on to external support agencies once the offender is 
no longer in prison (Millie and Erol, 2006).  Dawson (2005) explains how the multi-
agency partnership work has results in an increase in data sharing which provides all 
agencies involved with a PPO with a complete picture of the offender since becoming 
involved with the justice system.   
A challenge that has impeded the PPO strategy is insufficient housing being 
available upon release.  Millie and Erol emphasize that in order to resolve such housing 
issues, partnership work has been key.  They describe “better linkages across agencies” 
(2006:770) as an important factor for the PPO strategy to work.  In particular, Homel, 
Nutley, Webb, and Tilley (2004a) found that links with prisons, drug agencies, and 
employment and training providers are important in resettlement of offenders. 
In summary, partnerships in the United Kingdom were developed as a result of 
the Crime and Disorder Act and created the Crime Reduction Program along with crime 
reduction strategies such as the Drug Strategy, Drug Interventions Program, Prolific and 
Priority Offender Scheme, CCTVs, parenting orders, and information sharing 
agreements.  Crime reduction partnerships, teams, boards, and roles were created in an 
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effort to reduce crime through multi-agency approaches.  The Crime and Disorder 
Reduction Partnerships are a key component to crime reduction strategies at the local 
level and serve as an overarching body for other partnerships. 
Challenges for Crime Reduction Partnerships 
a. Information and Resource Sharing in Partnerships 
 
Throughout the crime reduction literature, a common obstacle to partnership work 
is the process of information and resource sharing along with appropriate disclosure 
between agencies and partners (Bullock et al., 2002; Bullock et al., 2006; Dawson, 2005; 
Gilling, 2005; Laycock and Webb, 2003; Maguire, 2004; Millie and Erol, 2006; Rogers, 
2006).  Bullock et al. state that “the general aim of working in partnership in the field of 
crime reduction is to share and mobilize resources in order to target them to best effect 
and to avoid unnecessary confusion, duplication and contradiction” (2006:143).  Maguire 
(2004) also points out the cost-effective and efficient aspects of multi-agency 
cooperation. 
Similarly, Rogers states “working together requires all local agencies to share 
information and to collaborate in planning basic service delivery in the interests of the 
community” (2006:39).  A number of writers list a variety of sources of information that 
are needed to assist in forming a crime reduction strategy and to profile an area.  These 
include recorded crime figures, service calls, census information, unemployment data, 
retail crime, housing data, social services data, exclusion and truancy data from schools, 
details of noise complaints from environmental health departments, probation data on 
offenders, data on drug treatment from health authorities, accident and emergency 
records on assaults, police authority data, fire service statistics, and data from voluntary 
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and private sector organizations (Bullock et al., 2002; Burgess, 2003; Hough and Tilley, 
1998; Rogers, 2006).  Information from all of the above agencies provides a more 
accurate picture of the problem and its social context (Bullock et al., 2002; Hough and 
Tilley, 1998). 
Burgess (2003) lists partners that can assist in decreasing the supply of drugs 
while recognizing that this is still primarily a police responsibility.  These partners are:  
neighbourhood or community wardens, traffic wardens, caretakers, and housing 
management staff.  Burgess also found that “this can identify buildings from which drugs 
are sold, streets with young people hanging around and the size, position and nuisance 
caused by sex markets” (2003:14). 
The Crime and Disorder Act was supposed to aid data sharing between agencies 
within the constraints of the 1998 Data Protection Act; however, Laycock and Webb 
argue that this has not happened.  They claim that “two thirds of bids had no data from 
other agencies when clearly in many cases this would have been extremely useful” 
(2003:291).  Some of the problems with multi-agency data sharing are (1) data 
protection, (2) practical difficulties of exchanging data between different computer 
systems, (3) geo-coding to different boundaries, (4) failures to collect or record 
information; incomplete or inaccurate data, (5) failure to code/enter information collected 
in standard ways, (6) issues of confidentiality, and (7) suspicion about why the data is 
needed and how it will be used (Bullock et al., 2002; Bullock et al., 2006; Dawson, 2005; 
Gilling, 2005; Home Office Crime Reduction Centre, 2003; Laycock and Webb, 2003). 
Obtaining information from health services has been a challenge, specifically 
drug treatment agencies.  The basis for this problem is a conflict between patient 
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confidentiality issues and the general need for public protection (Keene, Rodriguez, & 
Badger, 2005; Laycock and Webb, 2003; Maguire, 2004).  Burgess (2003) discusses how 
drug agencies are in a position where they can provide possible information that will help 
with locating hot spots and specific individuals involved in the drug market.  However, 
he explains that many of these agencies are reluctant to share sensitive information about 
individuals because they are there to provide a service to the drug users.  In relation to the 
obstacles discussed Maguire claims: 
It was unwise to assume that cooperation with crime reduction projects could 
readily be obtained from agencies for whom crime was not a focus of their 
mainstream activities. …Such problems were usually eased or resolved over 
time, but caused delays, changes or omissions in the planned implementation of 
multi-stranded projects. (2004:223)  
 
Some partnerships have dealt with the challenge of information exchange by having an 
information sharing agreement which addresses some of the concerns mentioned above.  
Rogers (2006) notes that many agencies involved in CDRPs use a protocol which clearly 
states the responsibilities regarding sharing information.   
b. Accountability in Partnerships 
 
Gilling (2000) describes crime prevention in most countries over the past century 
to be a ‘principle’, whereas the U.K. Crime and Disorder Act 1998 emphasizes crime 
prevention as a ‘practical project’.  Accountability in the U.K. is often determined and 
described by strategies, audits, performance management objectives and targets, 
assessments, and others.  Also, there is a heavy emphasis on evaluation and the 
requirement to publish these accountability systems (Hough and Tilley, 1998; Maguire, 
2004).   
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The Home Office accountability systems have a managerial focus.  Crawford 
claims: 
The Crime and Disorder Act is infused with a managerialist philosophy which is 
output-fixated and driven by performance measurement.  …The local community 
safety partnerships reflect this managerialist focus in the tasks and duties which 
they have been allocated.  They will be required to set targets and identify 
performance indicators. (1998a:248) 
 
The 2006 Home Office document titled Reducing crime, the harm caused by drugs and 
anti-social behaviour: Delivering PSA 1, PSA 4 and PSA 2: Partnership Assessment and 
Delivery System (PADS):  Guidance for partnerships is an assessment process which 
measures partnerships against ten indicators of quality in its ability to deliver and sustain 
improvements in crime reduction, to deliver the government’s drug strategy, and to tackle 
anti-social behaviour.  These quality indicators are leadership, establishing a shared 
vision and processes to deliver the vision, managing the local Community Safety 
Strategy, relationship management/people and partners, problem solving, effective use of 
resources, successful programs, performance management, community engagement, and 
communication.   
The audit is one of the U.K.’s main accountability methods as it helps 
partnerships set targets and develop strategies.  Rogers advises that “an audit is 
essentially a piece of research and should be structured to reflect sound research 
principles” (2006:202).  He lists four areas for carrying out an audit:  engaging with the 
community, reviewing activity and performance, helping to plan for change, and 
identifying priorities that fit in with broader community plans.   
Evidence-based policy and practice are evident in the U.K.’s accountability 
methods and lend themselves to the ‘modernization agenda’, according to Bullock et al.: 
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‘Modernization’ has included, among other things, performance management, 
local responsiveness, a move in principle to government steering (setting 
priorities and targets) and local agency rowing (deciding what to do to get there), 
joined-up working and the promise of devolved authority for those who perform 
well (earned autonomy), in addition to an emphasis on EBPP and the improved 
effectiveness, efficiency and value for money that are expected to follow suit.  
(2006:172) 
 
Crawford (1998a) also describes the setting of performance standards to be a process of 
governmental ‘steering’.   
Gilling claims that the concern over how crime prevention partnerships have 
performed and been perceived in the past is the reason for governmental concern and 
heavy involvement of the Audit Commission in crime reduction initiatives.  He advises 
that the Audit Commission deals with “the economy, efficiency, effectiveness and value 
for money of local public services, such as the police and local authorities, who are now 
heavily involved in CDRPs” (2005:735).  Crawford shares some of these crime 
prevention partnership concerns:   
There is a distinct ambivalence about crime prevention; it is much lauded but less 
often practiced.  For example, despite the heavy financial burden of the criminal 
justice system, relatively little money is allocated to crime prevention. (1998b: 
63)   
 
Only belatedly have issues concerned with the implementation and delivery of 
crime prevention risen to the fore in the criminological literature.  In the naivete 
of the early days of crime prevention it was as if all that was needed was a ‘good 
idea’ and the rest would take care of itself.  However, researchers have 
highlighted the importance of the concept of programme, its delivery and 
evaluation. (1998b:161)   
 
In addition, Crawford states: 
 
…the relationship between ‘prevention’ and ‘partnerships’ can be explained in 
part by the fact that crime prevention has tended to exist as a peripheral concern 
of numerous agencies, and yet a core activity of none. (1999:44) 
 
The partnerships are accountable to the community; therefore, it is appropriate 
that community consultation and engagement are other accountability mechanisms in the 
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strategies developed.  In 2006, the Home Office conducted a review of the partnership 
provisions of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.   This review included a recommendation 
that CDRPs engage more fully with communities.  In addition to being an accountability 
concern, this recommendation is focused on the Home Office governance strategy of 
engaging with the community (Bullock et al., 2006).   
A local survey is now part of the audit process for every crime and disorder 
partnership (Rogers, 2006).  Community consultation is one of the responsibilities of the 
CDRPs as it is part of the process leading up to the development of a crime reduction 
strategy that reflects the priority problems in a locality (Home Office Crime Reduction 
College, 2003).  
The influence of the civil renewal agenda can be seen in the government's most 
recent White Paper on police reform, Building Safer Communities Together, which 
argues for the following governance structure: 
A genuinely "bottom-up" approach to decision making on community safety 
issues - with opportunities for direct input and engagement for communities, 
together with strong oversight mechanisms at a local level and a higher, 
"strategic" level. (United Kingdom, Home Office 2003b:5.54; as cited in Hope, 
2005:381-382) 
 
c. Partnerships at the Local Level 
 
Crawford (1999) raises the question of why partnerships in criminal justice are on 
the rise.  Rogers states: 
The consequence of believing the myths for so long has been the creation of an 
expensive, inefficient, and self-perpetuating criminal justice system, a high crime 
rate, and large numbers of young people drifting into crime, which appears hard 
to refute.  Consequently, it is argued, only a comprehensive partnership approach 
to tackling crime and its associated problems involving all agencies can be seen 
as the way forward. (2006:10) 
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The Criminal Justice System will not be able to prevent crime on its own because it is not 
in control of many of the social and environmental causations of crime, and this is the 
reason for the emphasis on partnership work (Bright, 1991; Capobianco, 2005; Crawford, 
1998b, 1999; Johnston, 2001; Rogers, 2006; Scott, 2005). 
 Many writers conclude that governments and other agencies at the local level are 
in the most strategic position to directly deal with crime and disorder issues through 
policy development (Bright, 1991; Hope, 2001; Johnston, 2001; Rogers, 2006; Shaw, 
2001).  Crawford states: 
The very notion of community safety echoes the importance of locality.  It stands 
in contrast to what Rosenbaum (1988a) referred to as an ‘implant hypothesis’ 
which underscores much crime prevention practice, whereby pre-packaged 
programmes are implanted into local social environments with little sensitivity to 
the specific local context in the implementation process.  Rather than solutions 
being imposed on a local ecology, they should emerge out of the environment in 
which they have to survive. (1998b:193) 
  
Bright (1991) asserts that the crime prevention component of such services needs 
to be strengthened.  Capobianco states that there needs to be “emphasis on what can be 
done to prevent crime from occurring before the intervention of the criminal justice 
system, and to complement the work of the criminal justice system” (2005:5).  Scott 
recognizes: 
Much of police business consists of handling problems and cases that fall through 
the cracks in the ‘social net’ or constitute an overflow stemming from the limited 
resources of other agencies – for example, mentally ill persons who are not 
adequately cared for in the community; drug addicts who do not receive 
treatment services; parks, playgrounds and housing developments that are not 
adequately maintained; and cars and homes that are abandoned, etc. (2005:395) 
  
In 1990 the United Nations Congress wanted to “bring together those with 
responsibility for planning and development, for family, health, employment and training, 
housing and social services, leisure activities, schools, the police and the justice system in 
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order to deal with the conditions that generate crime” (United Nations, 1991; as cited in 
Rogers, 2006:27; Crawford, 1998b:32).   
d. Roles and Responsibilities in Partnerships 
 
Shaw (2006) advises that it is not the community safety concepts that have 
changed much over the years; instead, it is that they have been enhanced, and there has 
been a shift in the roles and responsibilities of all the actors.  In the U.K., crime control 
was traditionally known to be the responsibility of the Home Office, police, and criminal 
justice agencies (Rogers, 2006; Stenson and Edwards, 2003).  The Crime and Disorder 
Act 1998 intended to end the police monopoly over crime control by legislating a shared 
responsibility between the local authorities (Rogers, 2006).  
In order to decipher if there is a dominant agency in a partnership, Crawford uses the 
five models of coordination and structure which were identified in the Morgan Report:  
? The ‘independent’ model, with an independent coordinator 
? The ‘local authority based’ model 
? The ‘police centred local’ model 
? The ‘police centred headquarters’ model 
? The ‘indeterminate’ model, with no clear leader, coordinator or strategy. (1998b:170) 
 
The ‘corporate’ model was added by Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994).  This model has no 
lead agency; therefore, the partnership group shares responsibility.  Crawford (1998b) 
suggests that the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 creates a model of its own because the 
police and local authority are designated as the leaders.   
Probation and education are examples of cooperating bodies that have been 
identified as having the expertise and resources to contribute to crime control; therefore, 
they have a legal obligation to help deliver the objectives of crime reduction strategies 
(Rogers, 2006).  As a result, the recognition of specific roles and expectations of these 
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agencies is important in order to determine what information, resources, and knowledge 
they can provide.   
The responsible authorities must also invite the participation of others such as 
social landlords, drug and alcohol teams or workers, education councils, voluntary 
organizations, crown prosecution service, crown court manager, court committee, 
neighbourhood watch committee, and victim support workers (Rogers, 2006).  “Many of 
these groups have a large amount of information gathered during their day-to-day 
activities and can provide a fuller picture and understanding of the root causes of crime 
and disorder in the local community” (Rogers, 2006:201).   
Bullock et al. (2006) reminds us that engaging some partners has been difficult, 
and this was further acknowledged in the review of the Crime and Disorder Act 
conducted by the Home Office in 2006.  Furthermore, Crawford states that “there is a big 
gulf between the often-heard ideals of ‘partnerships’ and the reality of its practice” 
(1998b:184). 
Crawford (1999) explains that the reluctance of private sector involvement is due 
to crime not being a priority.  In addition, since this sector is subject to economic 
fluctuations, it prefers short-term projects that are more quantifiable.  Tilley found 
“efforts to involve the community create a host of further puzzles about whom to involve, 
how to engage them, what they can do and the means by which they can relate to local 
formal organizations” (2005:9).  The health sector is the area most commonly referred to 
in discussions around agencies reluctance to participate (Hughes and Gilling, 2004; 
Keene, Rodriguez, & Badger, 2005).  The reasons for this reluctance are (1) health 
authorities have limited resources to commit to the partnership process, (2) they have 
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doubts about the ir own role in crime and disorder partnerships, and (3) there is little 
recognition that it is part of their core responsibility (Philips, Jacobson, Prime, Carter, & 
Considine, 2002).   
To date, much has been written about the need for partnerships to have clarity on 
the roles and responsibilities of each agency involved in crime reduction work.  First of 
all, it increases efficiency by avoiding duplication of work.  Second, it helps overcome 
the dependency on the Criminal Justice System to reduce crime on its own.  Third, it 
extends and encourages responsibility to all of the organizations necessary in crime 
control.  Finally, it is necessary to make the best use of available expertise (Bullock et al., 
2006; Gilling and Barton, 1997; Millie and Erol, 2006).  
Gelsthorpe differentiates between five types of partnerships in terms of roles and 
identity: 
? The Communications Model:  organizations recognize that they have a role to 
play with one another but go little beyond communication. 
? The Cooperation Model:  agencies maintain separate boundaries and identities 
but work together on a mutually-agreed problem. 
? The Coordination Model:  agencies work together in a systematic way, there are 
defined boundaries, and resources are pooled to tackle mutually-agreed 
problems. 
? The Federation Model:  agencies retain their organizational distinctiveness but 
also adopt degrees of central focus. 
? The Merger Model:  agencies become indistinguishable from one another in 
working on a mutually-defined problem.  (1985; as cited in Johnston and 
Shearing, 2003:108) 
 
For the purposes of the work in the U.K., Crawford describes the role of multi-agency 
partnerships as a whole: 
Multi-agency partnerships involve the coming together of various agencies in 
relation to a given problem, without this significantly affecting or transforming 
the work they do.  The same tasks are conducted in cooperation with others.  The 
roles of the partners remain distinct.  Key officers are called on to represent their 
organization and to pool collective expertise and resources.  Their core tasks 
remain largely unaltered, as multi-agency work is grafted on to existing practices, 
or those existing practice are redefined. (1998b:174-175) 
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Furthermore, Sansfacon states “more than working alongside other organizations or 
taking responsibility or participating in roundtables, integrated approaches involve 
working with others to create new tools and develop a shared vision in order to co-
produce community safety” (2006:3). 
Johnston and Shearing claim ‘embedding’ is occurring at the occupational and 
functional level.  As a result, they claim that “it is now virtually impossible to identify 
any function within the governance of security in democratic states that is not, 
somewhere and under some circumstances, performed by non-state authorities as well as 
by state ones” (2003:33). 
Harris (2003) and Crawford (1998b) discuss the blurring of boundaries between 
organizations.  Crawford states “partnerships, by their nature, blur the boundaries 
between the roles and functions of incorporated organizations.  This can present 
difficulties for accountability and for the appropriate distribution of responsibilities. 
Hence, there is a need to maintain clarity of the divergent inputs and their collaborative 
objectives” (1998b:175).  Millie and Erol say that “this merging of boundaries between 
traditional roles is not unique to probation and prisons. There has been also an increasing 
involvement of police officers in offender supervision, often alongside existing probation 
supervision—as some have put it, possibly leading to a future polibation officer” 
(2006:692).  Harris notes that the issues surrounding boundary blurring are likely to 
continue in the partnership structures in the U.K.   
Crawford explains that there is more than one partner involved in the decision-
making and implementation processes; therefore, there is not one agency alone that can 
be held responsible for the outcomes.  Furthermore, he describes accountability as 
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“fragmented and dispersed” (1998b:180).  Gilling also raises concerns about roles and 
responsibilities. 
…it has been recognized for a long while that criminal justice is more of a 
fragmented, contradictory process than a coordinated system.  There is no reason 
to assume that the absorption of even more agencies under the community safety 
umbrella will result in greater coordination, but some logic is suggesting it might 
result in less. (2000:136) 
 
e. Value Conflicts and Power Differentials in Partnerships 
 
Conflict in multi-agency partnerships can be traced back to differences in agency 
philosophy, organizational style, professional history, procedures, structures, resources, 
leadership, lack of trust, and different beliefs on crime prevention (Crawford 1999; 
Gilling, 1993; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Tilley 2005).  According to Garland, “the 
criminal justice system itself is an historically contingent and (arbitrary) social construct, 
which has arisen more through competition between professional groups and agencies in 
pursuit of their own claims to specialist expertise and legitimacy than any rational 
strategic plan” (1990; as cited in Crawford, 1998b:11). 
According to Gilling (1993) partners have different discourses about crime 
causation.  Gilling states: 
Normally there is space within the criminal justice system for these different 
discourses to coexist in splendid isolation and independence, making conflict 
largely unnecessary.  There is a separation of powers and responsibilities which 
minimizes the need for communication and, resources allowing, enable each 
agency to effectively plough its own furrow.  However, a distinctive feature of 
the multi-agency approach is that is seeks to force agencies from a position of 
independence to one of interdependence, where the means to crime prevention 
effectiveness lies beyond the control of a single agency. … But it does not fit the 
actuality of two separate discourses and professional traditions.  If these 
traditions are required to come together and seek a common base for decision 
making in the situational approach to crime prevention then, like oil and water, 
they simply will not mix. (1993:153) 
 
Similarly, in critiquing the Crime Reduction Program, Maguire states: 
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It demanded the rapid identification, mobilization and coordination of large 
numbers of people and organizations with an array of skills in project design, 
oversight, management, monitoring and evaluation that were not in abundant 
supply within the criminal justice field. It also relied, implicitly at least, upon an 
assumed flexibility in professional cultures, whereby practitioners could be told 
or persuaded to work in new ways, not only within individual agencies, but also 
in the context of new forms of partnership between agencies unfamiliar with (and 
sometimes hostile to) each others’ aims, assumptions and practices. (2004:217) 
 
Crawford acknowledges that “not all agencies and groups are equally powerful.  
Organizations bring to crime problems competing claims to specialist knowledge and 
expertise, as well as differential access to both human and material resources.  It is not 
surprising, therefore, that certain agencies tend to dominate the policy agenda” 
(1998b:171-172).  Similarly, Homel et al. states “… this does not mean that the 
relationships within any partnership arrangements will always be equal. The nature of the 
power relationship between each agency involved in the partnership will be a product of 
what value they can add to the achievement of the joint outcomes” (2004a:20).  Phillips 
et al. (2002) also found that voluntary and community agencies experienced power 
imbalances with statutory organizations.   
 The police are the agency most commonly perceived as dominating meetings and 
the policy agenda (Gilling, 1993; Harris, 2003; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Millie and 
Erol, 2006; Phillips et al., 2002; Rogers, 2006).  Johnston and Shearing explain that “in 
the past, similar ‘community’-based initiatives have tended to be dominated by the police 
either because they have successfully maintained their hegemony over policing matters or 
– more usually – because they have been left to bear the responsibility for implementing 
initiatives alone” (2003:11).  “The police are often enthusiastic proponents of the multi-
agency approach, but they tend to prefer to set the agenda and dominate forum meetings, 
and then to ignore the multi-agency framework when it suits their own needs” (Sampson 
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et al., 1988; as cited in Rogers, 2006:8).  Gilling suggests “as the main custodians of 
information on crime it is they who are in the strongest position to authoritatively identify 
what is or is not to be regarded as a problem suitable for special preventive effort” 
(1993:154).   
Millie and Erol note that “if a wide range of non-statutory agencies are consulted, 
then it is important that they feel their views are valued—otherwise, cooperation and 
participation in such meetings will not be guaranteed” (2006:699).  Shaw states “if 
initiatives are to be sustained and effective, people must feel they have had a major role 
in creating and shaping them” (2006:6).  She goes on to state that “the development of 
meaningful participation, rather than consultation, in community safety and prevention is 
seen as a key mechanism for facilitating ownership, leadership and building skills and 
capacity, and for helping to change attitudes, strengthen social networks and build trust 
between partners” (2006:8).   
Harris (2003) says that teachers hold the power in drug education and prevention 
in the schools.  However, the teachers do not feel that they have this power because they 
are not as familiar with the legislative aspects of drugs or all the issues surrounding 
drugs.  Crawford provides a useful summary of the current situation:   
In the new order of things, diverse agencies and the public are to become co-
producers of public safety.  Yet the process of co-production is riddled with sites 
of conflict over values, purposes and priorities as well as considerable power 
imbalances between the parties incorporated into the co-production process. 
(1998b:193) 
 
In summary, partnerships in the United Kingdom have posed a number of 
challenges about (1) information and resource sharing, (2) accountability systems, (3) 
implementation at the local level, (4) roles and responsibilities, and (5) value conflicts 
and power differentials.  The exchange of information is difficult between some 
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organizations, but also necessary for effective and efficient partnership work.  Part of the 
sophistication of the U.K. crime reduction model is because of the accountability systems 
implemented by the local and central government including audits, performance targets, 
assessments, and evaluations.  These accountability structures are between the Home 
Office, Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships, and communities.  Partnerships at 
the local level emphasize the major role of local authorities and agencies in gathering 
information and creating crime reduction strategies.  The lack of clarity of roles and 
responsibilities between partners result in the blurring of boundaries, embedding 
responsibilities of security and safety within other occupations instead of within a 
specialist occupation, and confusion around accountability.  Value conflicts and power 
differentials occur due to different discourses about crime causation, leadership roles, and 
agency domination. 
Partnership work in the United Kingdom is influencing initiatives in Canada. 
Canada’s crime reduction partne rships will now be discussed through an example of the 
City of Surrey’s Crime Reduction Strategy. 
Crime Reduction Partnerships in Canada 
 
British Columbia’s Crime Reduction Initiative (CRI) is primarily based on the 
U.K. crime reduction approaches.  The British Columbia initiative was officially 
launched in September 2005 by the “E” Division RCMP as six detachments were chosen 
to implement crime reduction strategies (RCMP, 2006).  The three main objectives of the 
strategy are:  to reduce crime rates, to reduce fear of crime and to reduce the impact of 
anti-social behaviour on the quality of life (RCMP, 2006).  According to the RCMP: 
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Within policing, new teams and strategies drawn from existing resources will 
bring intelligence and contemporary criminology to bear on chronic crime 
problems and prolific offenders.  Across the justice system, partnerships will 
ensure that major players are working in the same direction with a common tool 
kit. … Rather than imposing a rigid “template” of CR activity in these 
jurisdictions, the pilot communities will take on the challenge of developing 
strategies tailored specifically to their local enforcement and criminal justice 
environment. (2006:6) 
 
The RCMP asserts that a crime reduction strategy should not be solely the responsibility 
of the police but should involve local partnerships and inter-agency cooperation, resulting 
in a shared undertaking.   
After visiting the United Kingdom and New York City the Mayor of the City of 
Surrey, Dianne Watts, announced an official Crime Reduction Strategy (CRS) (Skelton, 
2007, February 26).  The Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy is described in two ways.  
First, it states “the City of Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy is an innovative problem 
solving approach to addressing the causes and effects of crime”.  Second, “the Surrey 
Crime Reduction Strategy is a complete paradigm shift from what is currently being done 
in Canadian municipalities to combat crime.   It is an approach that seeks to incorporate 
all the key stakeholders and create one, unified, comprehensive plan” (City of Surrey, 
2007b).  The mayor describes the strategy as comprehensive in that it involves over fifty 
organizations and all three levels of government.  The organizations include:  RCMP, 
non-profit, provincial and federal governments, parole, crown counsel, school board, 
Board of Trade, and community agencies.   
The Mayor of Surrey states that the provincial and federal governments are in 
support of the CRS.  However, while she acknowledges the importance of support from 
higher levels of government, she asserts that “municipal governments should take the 
lead in fighting crime” (Skelton, 2007, February 26:A2).  Furthermore, Wally Oppal, the 
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Attorney General for British Columbia, states “the problem with the existing criminal 
justice system is that its components operate in isolation … we need a complete shift in 
philosophy.  We can’t keep doing business the way it’s been done in the past.  The world 
has changed” (Bellett, 2007, February 27:B8). 
 The mayor recognizes that some recommendations in the CRS are outside of 
municipal jurisdiction, such as community courts and changes in prison sentencing.  The 
mayor explains that some initiatives can be carried out without the support of higher 
levels of government and that they have already begun implementing some of these 
initiatives (Skelton, 2007, February 27).  Initiatives that have taken place so far include a 
part-time homelessness outreach worker to find permanent housing for individuals, the 
creation of Prolific Offender Target Teams by the Surrey RCMP, and the creation of 
partnerships.     
The City of Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy describes its four primary objectives 
as: 
1. reduce crime and increase community safety 
2. increase public involvement in reducing crime 
3. increase integration between all stakeholders involved in crime reduction 
4. improve public awareness around the reality and perception of crime. (City of Surrey, 
2007a)  
 
These objectives are to be attained through the development of initiatives and action 
plans under the four components, or strands, of the strategy:  (1) prevent and deter crime, 
(2) apprehend and prosecute offenders, (3) rehabilitate and reintegrate offenders, and (4) 
reality and perceptions of crime.  The Mayor’s Task Force on Public Safety and Crime 
Reduction is divided into four sub-committees representing each of the four strands (City 
of Surrey, 2007a).   
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Under the Prevent and Deter Strand, the strategy advises that the City and the 
RCMP look into the creation of Community Safety Officers (CSO).  A CSO is “not a 
member of the police force but has a level of delegated authority to support the RCMP in 
the prevention and deterrence of crime” (City of Surrey, 2007a:11).  In addition to 
Community Safety Officers, another recommendation is the development of a protocol 
that requires these officers, outdoor city workers, community volunteer patrols, 
firefighters, and RCMP to wear visible safety vests for increased visibility and awareness 
for the public (City of Surrey, 2007a).  Enhancing safety on transit and skytrains is 
another recommendation requiring partnership work with transit authorities.   
Ensuring databases are current and available to researchers is an important aspect 
of the Crime Reduction Strategy.  In addition, the City wants to establish a Shopping 
Centre Advisory Committee with the RCMP, representatives from large shopping centers 
in the city, Surrey Board of Trade, Chambers of Commerce, and Business Improvement 
Associations (City of Surrey, 2007a).   
The mayor also intends to put CCTVs in crime hot spots (City of Surrey, 2007a; 
Skelton, 2007, February 27).  This would require working with private sector partners 
and input from the Privacy Commissioner.  Insurance companies will provide rate 
reduction program for private property owners who install CCTV cameras (City of 
Surrey, 2007a:16). 
Another important component to the crime reduction strategy is the establishment 
of Community Drug Action Teams.  The following agencies would take part in creating a 
protocol for these teams:  the RCMP, Fire Department, Probation, School District, Fraser 
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Health Authority – Mental Health and Addiction.  According to the Crime Reduction 
Strategy:  
These community based outreach teams will deliver the city’s drug strategy at the 
local level and assist individuals on the street (ie. homeless, sex trade workers, 
cronic runaways, drug addicts, youth at risk etc.) to access social support 
networks and wrap around services (ie. housing, medical attention, treatment 
etc.). Research shows that 1-on-1 contact has the greatest benefit in assisting 
those at risk. (City of Surrey, 2007a:16) 
 
The City of Surrey is also recommending:  
That the City work in collaboration with the School District and appropriate 
Provincial authorities to establish a process for the creation of legally-binding, 
negotiated and voluntary “parenting orders” that would support parents, whose 
children are determined to be involved in crime, to become re-involved with 
raising their children in a responsible manner.  
 
That the City, Fraser Health Authority and community agencies review and 
expand, where appropriate, parenting support programs to assist parents in 
raising their children in a responsible manner. (2007a:18) 
 
In addition, the CRS explained the concept of creating Community Action Groups:  
 
In conjunction with Neighbourhood Associations, RCMP, Surrey Fire 
Department, Surrey Bylaw Enforcement, Surrey Building Inspectors, Surrey 
Electrical Fire Safety Initiative, Board of Trade, Chambers of Commerce, 
Business Improvement Associations and other stakeholders in each of Surrey’s 
Town Centres. These groups will work with the RCMP to develop strategies to 
address neighourhood issues such as graffiti, vandalism, drug dealing, drug 
houses, businesses that attract crime, motels allowing criminal activity to take 
place, crime hot spots and general nuisance activity. (City of Surrey, 2007a:19) 
 
Multi-agency cooperation is also anticipated in the zero tolerance policy for 
graffiti.  This would pertain to public and private property through by- laws as well as 
involve partnership work with the Ministry of Highways, the GVTA, BC Hydro, Telus, 
BC Hydro, Shaw Cable and Terasen (City of Surrey, 2007a). 
The second strand is the Apprehend and Prosecute Offenders Strand.  This strand 
targets prolific offenders since “estimates indicate that approximately 20% of the 
criminals are involved in or cause 80% of the “priority” crimes” (City of Surrey, 
2007a:20).  Some of the recommendations under this strand include sharing information 
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among organizations, raising the importance of data gathering; and implementing the 
Automatic License Plate Recognition (ALPR) systems. This strand also targets drugs in 
the city.  As  a result, it suggests that the City work closely with the Surrey Fire 
Department, RCMP, Solicitor General, and Electrical Inspectors in relation to grow 
operations, the equipment used in grow-ops, and the electrical safety hazards they create 
(City of Surrey, 2007a).    
The second strand aims to establish a Community Court for offenders who have 
an addiction.  This would include a Community Justice Resource Team which is a team 
of support service experts.  “This process must involve the police, Crown Counsel, 
defense Counsel and Court judges to ensure the full benefit of the alternative Community 
Court process is recognized” (City of Surrey, 2007a:22).  In addition to Community 
Court, the CRS suggests Night Court to increase courtroom capacity and to shorten the 
delay time from charge to trial.  Along with enhanced treatment programs in and out of 
prison, the CRS promotes longer incarceration time for offenders who do not go into 
treatment.   
Another component of the CRS under the Apprehend and Prosecute Offenders 
Strand is the establishment of Prolific Offender Management Teams (POMT).  The City 
is required to work with probation, social services, health authorities, community support 
teams, Attorney General, Solicitor General, RCMP, and others to form POMTs.  The City 
of Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy explains that “POMTs will follow an offender 
throughout the criminal justice system to assess and address factors that cause the 
offender to commit crime” (City of Surrey, 2007a:23). 
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The third strand is the Rehabilitate and Reintegrate Strand.  This is described as a 
“client-centered approach” that delivers “wrap around services” for offenders (City of 
Surrey, 2007a).  The wrap around services entail treatment, housing, education and skills 
development, career development, support worker, leisure/social activities, and program 
monitoring.  Legislation has been recommended allowing for drug testing upon arrest.  
Treatment programs become mandatory for prolific offenders with addiction problems. 
The Crime Reduction Strategy says that “the City continue to work with the 
private sector, not for profit organizations and key stakeholders to provide treatment 
facilities, beds and programs” (City of Surrey, 2007a:25).  In order to aim for continuity 
of support for individuals as they move throughout the different services, agencies, and in 
some cases in and outside of prison, the CRS recommends that Community Support 
Teams be created.  Community Support Teams provide “ongoing support to individuals 
on a one-on-one basis through the duration of their program of treatment and 
reintegration from the Criminal Justice System” (City of Surrey, 2007a:29).  The creation 
of cross-functional outreach teams for prolific offenders with mental disorders is also part 
of the Crime Reduction Strategy.  
The Reality and Perceptions of Crime is the fourth strand and it contains 
information gathering, communication of information, prioritizing actions to address 
most fearful/most vulnerable first, and increasing physical “visibility” to reduce the fear 
of crime (City of Surrey, 2007a).  One of the main recommendations that arose out of this 
strand is to regularly conduct community safety surveys.  The Reality and Perceptions of 
Crime strand calls for the creation of databases of agencies that can provide the various 
services listed throughout the CRS and performance indicators for each recommendation 
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and monitoring systems for measurement, evaluation, and accountability purposes.  A 
board would develop and oversee the implementation of the recommendations (City of 
Surrey, 2007a).   
The first stage of the CRS is to publish recommendations.  The second phase is to 
create and implement the recommendations by the end of 2007 (City of Surrey, 2007a).  
The job posting for a crime reduction strategy manager describes the position as: 
Responsible for the leadership, development and implementation of a 
groundbreaking crime reduction program for the City of Surrey. … responsible 
for conducting research, analyzing data, developing effective strategy and related 
operational plans and then assisting with implementing the strategy.  
Communicating and building effective partnerships with a broad range of 
stakeholders and agencies is fundamental to success in this position.  (City of 
Surrey, 2007b) 
 
The strategy states that it will be this person’s role “to coordinate the preparation of the 
Implementation Plan and assist in the “roll out” of the Implementation Plan with the wide 
array of stakeholders that will need to be involved in that process” (City of Surrey, 
2007a:35).   
In summary, the City of Surrey is bringing together key players in an effort to 
develop multi-agency partnerships and strategies to reduce crime.  The Crime Reduction 
Strategy addresses housing and homelessness issues, drug addictions and treatment, 
prolific offenders, and crime “hot spots” through recommendations for the development 
of new roles and partne rships.  Drug Action Teams, Prolific Offender Target Teams, and 
Community Support Teams will target drug-using offenders caught in the crime cycle 
with an aim of rehabilitating and reintegrating them into the community. The Crime 
Reduction Strategy Manager position and the recommendation for Community Safety 
Officers are ways to branch out the duties of policing in reducing crime.   The crime 
reduction strategies in the United Kingdom and Canada are very comprehensive and 
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include many partnerships.  Explanations for the developments of such partnerships will 
be discussed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 3: Explanations for Governance through 
Partnerships 
 
 
Over the past forty years there has been a significant change in how we govern 
and view crime.  These changes are apparent in all sectors of the Criminal Justice System 
because crime has become an established part of society.  Although the government 
sector of policing has not had any radical changes, policing has still shifted over the 
years.  For example, community policing, crime prevention, crime reduction and 
partnership work emerged and have all had roles in this shift.  An overview of the 
changes that have occurred in general throughout the government and Criminal Justice 
System in Canada and the United Kingdom will be outlined followed by a closer look at 
the policing sector, as well as how one accounts for such changes.  
Garland (2000) and Rose (2000) claim there have been a series of transformations 
in official perceptions of crime, in criminological discourse, in modes of governmental 
action and in the structure of criminal justice organizations.  Garland (1996) discusses the 
new criminologies of everyday life which are made up of a set of theoretical frameworks 
including rational choice theory, routine activities theory, crime as opportunity and 
situational crime prevention theory.  These theories are based on the idea that crime is a 
normal part of society and, as a result, a new collective experience of crime will 
inevitably emerge.   
The primary purpose of the government is the welfare of the population, the 
improvement of its condition, and the increase of its wealth (Foucault, 1991).  In order to 
meet this objective to the best of its ability, the government has shifted dramatically over 
the past few decades from a welfare state to a neo- liberal government.  With regard to the 
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Criminal Justice System specifically, crime and punishment have undergone a marked 
change.  Garland (1996) suggests that as the “war against crime” campaign slowly fades, 
there is a decrease in the overall commitment towards a penal welfare strategy.  Instead, 
the effects of crime-costs, victims, and fearful citizens became the focus.  This shift is 
described as a transition from being causes-oriented to effects-oriented.  Hughes and 
Edwards states five broad reasons for what they refer to as “the crisis of the welfare-penal 
complex”: 
? The increasing rate of recorded crime and the numbers of people passing through 
the different parts of the system, despite the growing affluence and the welfare 
state; 
? Overload combined with a crisis of efficiency (e.g. the declining clear-up rates of 
the police, overloaded courts and the overcrowding of prisons); 
? A growing awareness of extensive social and economic costs of crime; and 
? The increasing recognition that formal processes of criminal justice (i.e. 
detection, apprehension, prosecution, sentencing and punishment of offenders) 
have only a limited effect on controlling crime. (2005:17) 
 
According to Foucault (1991), the problems of government are how to govern 
oneself, how to be governed, how to govern others, by whom people will accept being 
governed, and how to be the best possible governor.  Rhodes provides a useful definition 
of governance: 
Governance signifies a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process 
of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which 
society is governed.  (1995; as cited in Crawford, 1999:3, original emphasis) 
 
Active state involvement is the welfare state approach to governing and it has the 
mentality of taking care of everyone it governs and any associated social problems 
(Garland, 1996).  Many writers, however, have questioned the effectiveness of the 
welfare state in governing crime (Bright, 1991; Capobianco, 2005; Crawford, 1998b, 
1999; Johnston, 2001; Rogers, 2006; Rose, 2000; Scott, 2005).  There has been a loss of 
confidence in welfare states approaches to crime and public concern has remained high.   
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The present neo- liberal approach focuses on responsibilization.  In contrast to the 
welfare state approach, the government does not solve everyone’s problems for them and 
does not lead society to believe that it is able to cure the social problem of crime.  
Garland (1996) refers to this new way of governing crime problems as the 
‘responsibilization strategy’ where the public takes responsibility for its own security.  
Consequently, with a shift from the welfare state to neo-liberalism, government 
objectives and tactics change.  The government needs to employ tactics rather than laws 
because goals are no longer being achieved through law and a true understanding of how 
one is governing is to examine the tactics used (Foucault, 1991; O’Malley, 1992).  As a 
result, neo-liberalism uses the strategic approach of involving and empowering families, 
communities, and other institutions to address many social problems and to take more 
responsibility for crime control.  This adaptive state strategy can be described as 
governing-at-a-distance (Rose, 2000).  Rogers says that “others must be made aware that 
they too have a responsibility in this regard, and have to be persuaded to change their 
practices in order to reduce criminal opportunities and increase formal controls” (2006:7). 
In the United Kingdom there has been a movement from ‘crime prevention’ to 
‘community safety’.  The Home Office points out : 
The term crime prevention is often narrowly interpreted and this reinforces the 
view that it is solely the responsibility of the police.  On the other hand, the term 
community safety is open to wider interpretation and could encourage greater 
participation from all sections of the community. (1991; as cited in Rogers, 
2006:4) 
 
Throughout this shift in governance the government becomes a facilitator opposed 
to a provider.  This new role means that the government has to withdraw as the main 
provider for security and crime control.  In part this is due to the monopolizing tendencies 
of the state apparatus (Garland, 1996).  Herman Goldstein states that, “we must restore a 
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balance between citizen and police responsibilities that reflects a more accurate 
assessment of actual capacities and acknowledges that effective social control cannot 
possibly be achieved by hired hands alone” (cited in Sheptycki, 1998:492).  In other 
words, the government does not want to give up its role as state protector, but at the same 
time, it has proven to be incapable of carrying out the tasks that they were once in charge 
of on their own.   
Although there has been a shift from a welfare state to a neo- liberal state, in many 
ways, the two forms of governance are occurring simultaneously in the area of crime 
control (Braithwaite, 2000).  On the one hand we have three strikes and you are out, 
mandatory minimum sentencing laws, parole release restrictions, no frills prisons, 
corporal punishment, boot camps, super maximum prisons, zero tolerance policies, and 
community notification laws and pedophile registers (Rose, 2000).  On the other hand we 
have prevention and partnership as well as rehabilitation (Braithwaite, 2000).   
There has been a new penology of actuarial decision making and public private 
partnerships.  Braithwaite states that there has been “a shift from reactive, punishment-
based systems of justice to proactive, preventive ones whose practices are consistent with 
the principles of restoration, reparation and mediation.” (2000; as cited in Johnston, 
2001:974).  This is evident in the emergence of programs such as restorative justice and 
victim services, which focus on the effects of crime instead of the causes as discussed 
earlier.  Stenning and Shearing (1980) noted that in the late 1970s a ‘quiet revolution’ had 
undermined the centrality of state-centered policing.  In the late 18th century, policing 
gradually changed its role into one concerned with the ma intenance of public order, riot 
control, and crime prevention (Sheptycki, 1998).   
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There is a new view of policing as a ‘service’ and a redesignation of the 
community as ‘consumers’.  Bayley and Shearing (1996) report that some departments 
treat the public like customers and measure performance by surveys of public satisfaction 
instead of only by the number of crimes and arrests.  Crawford notes that “the 
‘community’ and public, previously defined as recipients of a service – a conception 
supported and extended by the establishment of the welfare state – more recently have 
been called upon, in various different ways, to join the ‘fight against crime’” (1999:265).  
Rogers states, “by holding out the belief that the police alone can solve the problem of 
crime, this may serve to undermine the fact that the police need the support and trust of 
the local public and other agencies” (2006:158).  
Since the duties of policing have been distributed across a range of institutions, 
policing became pluralized and continues to pluralize.  Shearing offers an understanding 
of the process of pluralization of police: 
We are witnessing what Rose (1996) terms ‘the death of the social’:  whereas 
governance was once conducted through and for a social sphere, we are presently 
seeing an expansion of political power beyond the state, in which non-state 
agencies govern expanses of formerly social space with a view to securing 
community interests. (2000:392) 
 
The police redefine themselves as a facilitator rather than a provider.  Crawford (2006) 
describes the state as performing ‘steering’ functions while leaving the ‘rowing’ to 
others.  Similarly, Johnston and Shearing (2003) refer to the government separating 
functions into ‘establishing’ and ‘implementing’ their standards.   
Johnston (2005) describes the challenges to police sovereignty.  Four models of 
security governance are proposed by Johnston:   
… that police should maintain the governing status quo, doing more street level 
policing but doing it more effectively; that police should accept the reality of 
pluralization but, having done so, should secure oversight of its coordination and 
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regulation; that police should compete with commercial and municipal providers 
in order to secure ‘in house’ governance of street-level policing; and that police 
should accept pluralization, devolve certain functions to the private sector and 
concede on any automatic claim to sovereignty.  (2005:242-243) 
 
Five driving forces behind the restructuring under private and government support 
are listed by Bayley and Shearing (1996).  These forces consist of fear of crime, inability 
of the government to satisfy society’s longing for security, cultural individualism, the 
commodification of security, and the rise of mass private property.  Bayley and Shearing 
(1996) define this shift or change as being due to two developments; the pluralizing of 
policing and the search by the public police for an appropriate role.  Johnston argues: 
People’s knowledge of crime and experiences of fear are embedded in local 
social relations and inscribed within routine acts of (self)-governance.  This 
suggests two things:  that an understanding of fear of crime demands an analysis 
of local issues other than crime; and that any solution to the governance of crime 
– particularly under present-day conditions where the provision of security is 
highly diversified – will demand a consideration of non-state modes of 
governance, including citizen-based ones. (2001:959) 
 
 The police are no longer considered the experts on policing issues because the 
area has expanded by becoming very broad in nature (Crawford, 1998b, 1999; Harris, 
2003; Millie and Erol, 2006).  Braithwaithe (2000) found that business regulatory 
agencies grew to be more significant law enforcers than the police with at least twice as 
many private police, such as hired security, as public police in Canada and the United 
Kingdom.  Malm et al. reported that security companies “have begun to act in matters 
such as investigating corporate fraud, preventing computer crime and conducting forensic 
analyses that have traditionally been done by public police” (2005:3).  There is a 
recognition that crime is too extensive and complex to be dealt with solely by the police; 
therefore, they are disseminating some of their duties to other control providers.  Over the 
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past fifteen years, governments have gone beyond passive acceptance to active 
encouragement of commercial private security (Bayley and Shearing, 1996).   
Since WWII, private security is seen as a necessary addition to the public police.  
Private security uses the approach of prevention rather than the public police approach of 
detection and punishment.  The police now look at similar approaches to those of private 
security (Bayley and Shearing, 1996).  Bayley and Shearing (1996) have observed that it 
is now popular with the public and the police to encourage volunteers to do “police 
work”.     
Bayley and Shearing (1996) describe how the police currently share their work in 
other ways.  First of all, they sell their protective services, such as charging fees for 
covering rock concerts and being hired as private security guards.  Secondly, civilians 
and police auxiliaries share responsibilities with public policing.  For example, auxiliaries 
serve without pay and weapons, but they are very similar in appearance as the police.  
Also, work traditionally performed by uniformed officers is being given to civilian 
employees in areas such as dispatch, forensics, records, victim services, volunteer 
coordination, crime prevention classes, and secur ity inspections of premises. 
Many police departments have reduced their activities in licensing bars, enforcing 
parking violations, organizing neighbourhood watches, and advising property owners 
about home security measures (Bullock et al., 2006).  As a result, these activities have 
been given to the private sector, the community, volunteers, and government ministries to 
employ and to establish partnerships in an effort to reduce crime (Griffiths, Parent, & 
Whitelaw, 2001).  Shearing observes that “this has reshaped states, from states conceived 
of governance largely in terms of direct provision, to what Braithwaite (2000) has termed 
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"regulatory states" that prefer to steer while leaving much of the rowing of governance to 
others” (2004:197-198). 
Under the Crime and Disorder Act in the United Kingdom “non-specialized state 
agents (such as education, health and housing departments), commercial organizations, 
voluntary bodies and ‘responsible citizens’, have a collective duty to work alongside the 
specialized police organizations in pursuit of security goals” (Johnston and Shearing, 
2003:70).  Bullock, Erol, and Tilley state “more recently, in the U.K., the term ‘problem-
oriented partnership’ has come to be preferred by many to ‘problem-oriented policing’” 
(2006:7-8).  Crawford discusses the potential benefits of these “new horizontal relations 
that cut across traditional hierarchies” as: 
[A] fundamental shift in the way we govern crime and its prevention . . . afford 
the potential to encourage a stronger and more participatory civil society and 
challenge many of the modernist assumptions about professional expertise, 
specialisation, state paternalism and monopoly. (1998; as cited in Crawford, 
2006:460) 
 
Capobianco summarizes the recent shift in governing accordingly: 
The traditional model of government agencies administering education, health, 
social service, security, environment and criminal justice programmes in 
isolation from each other is giving way to increased collaboration within 
departments, between agencies, between levels of governments and between 
public, private, and nonprofit sectors. As governments continue to face more 
complex problems, and citizens expect more, the way in which government 
delivers services and results, is changing to a more ‘joined-up’ and multi-
partnership approach. (2005:5) 
 
Garland clarifies that “this arrangement does not necessarily mean that the State 
offloads the responsibility for public safety to citizens, but rather, engages other actors 
such as businesses, local authorities, and community based organizations in local crime 
prevention efforts” (1996, 2001; as cited in Capobianco, 2005:5).  Gilling states “the 
promotion of partnerships has allowed government to avoid economically damaging 
allegations of the state over-reaching itself, and overstating its competence, whilst 
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cleverly facilitating the corollary of this, namely, the off- loading of responsibility for 
crime and security on to others” (2005:743).  Power discusses how the new methods in 
crime control include the requirement of statutory partnerships at the local level, audits, 
contracts, and performance indicators and that these techniques “allow those that ‘steer’ 
to monitor and correct the activities of those that ‘row’” (1997; as cited in Crawford, 
1998b:253).  Sansfaçon argues that “the responsibility devolved to local authorities can 
mean a loss of sovereignty by the central government and a tendency toward 
communitarianism instead of the traditional top-down approach to equal justice” 
(2004:11).  Sansfaçon implies that this may also be a new way or technique for the state 
to ensure its presence at the local level.  Crawford asserts that this new technique does 
not imply a withdrawal of the state.  Crawford states “the British state is engaged in 
ambitious projects of social engineering in which the deployment of hierarchy, command 
and interventionism are prevalent” (1999:449).  Sansfaçon balances these observations 
when he states “the point is not so much the offloading by the State but rather the 
decentering of the ways standards are set, which was formerly done exclusively from the 
top down” (2004:12).  Crawford observes: 
[T]he trends are not merely upward (to the nation state or even supra-national 
state) or downward (to localities, communities, and consumers), but also outward 
into the new policy networks of ‘partnerships’ which are increasingly refiguring 
relations between centre and periphery in the criminal justice complex. 
(Crawford, 1999:223, original emphasis) 
 
Crawford uses a boat analogy when discussing crime prevention and partnership 
policies at the local level under the U.K. system of governance.  He comments: 
For if these institutions occupy merely a ‘rowing’ function, this would appear to 
fly in the face of government rhetoric about the importance of ‘local ownership’ 
and the elaboration of a ‘local vision’.  What, therefore, is the policymaking role 
of local community safety partnerships?  Are they merely rowing a boat, the 
direction of which is set by others, or are they themselves in charge of the 
direction?  There seems to be a crucial tension between local control and central 
 46 
steering which government has not addressed.  Even if steering is conceived of as 
only a limited process of setting boundaries within which local initiatives must 
operate, then the question remains:  how constraining are these boundaries to be? 
(1998b:255) 
   
 In summary, there are a number of explanations for the move to “partnerships” or 
“pluralizing” of police in Canada:  (1) the shift from a welfare state to a neo- liberal state, 
(2) the loss of faith in the Criminal Justice System, (3) the end of the police monopoly 
over crime control, (4) the managerialism of policing and the consumerization of the 
public, and (5) the rise in mass private property.  As a result, governing-at-a-distance and 
responsibilization strategies developed.  One of the governance tactics has been an 
emphasis on partnerships in an effort to address crime. 
In order to link together the gathered literature on partnerships in the United 
Kingdom and Canada along with the explanations for these partnerships, the following 
themes will be addressed in the next chapter:  (1) differences in government structure and 
legislation, (2) implementation and delivery of a crime reduction model, and (3) 
limitations and governance issues, such as accountability systems, blurring boundaries, 
and the offloading of responsibilities. 
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Chapter 4: Discussion and Analysis 
 
 
There are differences between the United Kingdom and Canada which should be 
addressed before implementing the British model in Canada.  First, the government 
structure in the United Kingdom is different than the structure in Canada.  Second, 
legislation, policy, and regulation are more evident in the United Kingdom.  Third, the 
program concept is being driven in a bottom-up fashion in British Columbia, primarily by 
policing and City officials.  In other jurisdictions where similar programs have been 
implemented, such as in the United Kingdom, the process was driven from the top-down.  
In addition to these three challenges, multi-agency partnerships in any country will 
encounter difficulties in the partnership work itself. 
a. Government Structures and Legislation 
 
While both the U.K. and Canada are parliamentary democracies, there are some 
differences in the structure and responsibilities of local government.  The Criminal 
Justice System in England and Wales has the Home Office to deal with issues relating to 
criminal law, the police, prisons, and probation.  There are twenty government offices for 
the nine English regions, but these are not separate decision and policy making bodies 
from central governments.  In contrast, the responsibility of Canada’s Criminal Justice 
System and social services are divided between the federal, provincial, and municipal 
government.  
The social service structure in the U.K. is different from Canada in that the central 
government is responsible for social housing and drug treatment options.  Therefore, the 
central government is able to make health and housing authorities assist in crime 
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reduction initiatives and partnerships.  The governing body is common for all of these 
areas whereas in Canada emergency housing and local drug treatment services fall under 
either provincial government level responsibility, or non-profit, non-governmental 
responsibility, or are often privately owned.  
In the U.K., at the municipal level, there is ‘local government’ or ‘local 
authorities’.  Each municipality has either an elected mayor or a council leader.  
Councilors represent a ‘ward’ usually comprising forty thousand people although the size 
of wards varies.  The U.K. is divided into count ies, districts, cit ies, boroughs, and wards.  
In an area with a high population, a local authority could have sixty or more councilors.  
Therefore, there are many more councilors with responsibility for local affairs than in 
Canada.  This means that crime reduction strategies are the mandate of many more local 
officials in the United Kingdom.  This results in more crime reduction work being 
implemented locally and more people to share the responsibility and workload. 
The difference in government structure as well as legislation in the United 
Kingdom and Canada may pose a challenge in the level of success of crime reduction 
strategies in Canadian municipalities.  In the United Kingdom, crime reduction is a 
funded and legislated government vision to deal with crime issues, and the model offers a 
different way of governance.  The model consists of legislated multi-agency partnerships 
where specific crime reduction targets are set out and followed because the partners are 
held accountable and the outcomes of the strategies are measured and sustained.  In the 
United Kingdom, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 acts as a driver for agencies to work 
together on crime problems.  Unlike the U.K., Canada has not legislated the requirement 
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of certain agencies to cooperate with the police and city officials in reducing crime.  This 
raises the question of what is driving agencies in British Columbia.  
b. Implementation and Delivery 
 
The implementation of crime reduction in Canada will not be about requiring 
local government to deliver a major new service or to take on substantial new burdens 
because unlike the United Kingdom, Canada has not legislated such action into existence.  
Therefore, the crime reduction initiative, at least in its initial phase, will have to be 
launched on the good will, commitment, and vision of agency leaders who can see its 
potential.  This is likely to look differently in every municipality. 
While the City of Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy states that all of the strategies 
will be monitored, evaluated, and shared with the public, what kind of accountability will 
be built into the Canadian model to ensure agencies within the partnerships remain 
accountable to each other and to the strategy itself?  Also, what happens if an agency, 
whose participation is necessary in order to implement a strategy to its fullest potential, 
does not wish to participate in the process?  Without legislation governing partnerships, it 
may be impossible to ensure complete commitment or to acquire secure accountability 
systems.  This raises the issue of whether these new crime reduction strategies will unfold 
any differently than crime prevention initiatives in the past.  For instance, it is possible 
that once the initial enthusiasm for such an elaborate initiative fades, partners will simply 
view it as just another committee they are a part of with the occasional meeting to attend 
and only do a minimal amount of work when time allows on top of their regular duties. 
The extent of sustainable public safety initiatives in British Columbia 
municipalities has been limited.  For example, currently, there is little accountability and 
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respect for existing crime prevention initiatives because many of them offer few 
measurable outcomes.  In comparison to the United Kingdom, Canada has not done crime 
prevention very well.  Therefore, it needs to be asked if current crime prevention 
initiatives are productive in terms of a cost-benefit analysis.  Are the resources being put 
towards these initiatives worth it?  Are the effectiveness of programs being properly 
measured?  While the Home Office in the U.K. is responsible for a sophisticated crime 
reduction model that provides direction at the local level, there is no set model or strategy 
for crime prevention programs carried out in police departments throughout Canada.  
Perhaps the crime reduction and partnership model will assist British Columbia in 
changing the current trend and getting past the failures of programs and partnerships 
whose effectiveness is not being measured. 
In the past, Canada has seen partnership work result in minute effectiveness 
through community policing and crime prevention.  Partnerships encompassed within 
community policing and crime prevention have simply involved organizational 
rearrangement and re-articulation, short-term projects, ‘lip-service’, public relations, very 
little resources, programs not being monitored or evaluated, and more of a philosophy 
than actual practice.  It appears that consumerism accountability structures, such as 
targets, audits, performance indicators, and community surveys, are in place in the U.K. 
as a means to getting past the stigma that community policing, crime prevention 
initiatives, and partnerships have created in the past.  In order to increase efficiency and 
effectiveness, a strong focus on community accountability, monitoring, and evaluation 
have been modeled in the U.K.  For British Columbia, an advantage is that it has had the 
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opportunity to study the U.K. model and learn from its challenges and successes; thus, 
adapting best practices in accountability to fit a Canadian context. 
The effort and research the City of Surrey has put into studying the U.K. model is 
likely to result in some crime reduction strategies and methods working in Surrey.  
Consequently, this provides Surrey with the potential to set the model for the rest of the 
province and possibly the country.  Surrey has asked the following necessary questions:  
is it plausible, is it practical, has it worked elsewhere, would it work here, and is the 
context right.  It was in England that the institution of policing developed and had a 
major effect upon Canadian policing.  Similarly, the RCMP is utilizing best practices in 
crime reduction found in the United Kingdom.  It is apparent that the RCMP is moving 
towards a crime reduction model with a focus on partnerships in an effort to become 
more effective and to deal with the fact that police resources are limited while police 
work is becoming more complex.  While there have been advancements in technology 
and techniques in policing, these cannot substitute for the effects of partnership building 
at the local level.  Effective partnership work at the national, regional, and local level as 
well as between public, private, and voluntary sectors is the ideal approach in addressing 
crime issues.   
Crime reduction in British Columbia will have to recognize everyone’s role and 
duties in reducing crime and would be a better coordinated approach to dealing with 
crime issues than what is currently in place.  Currently, agencies and organizations 
operate in silos or independently with little meaningful partnership work in place.  If the 
recommendations proposed within the City of Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy take 
place, other outside partners, such as probation service, crown counsel, health services, 
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and many others, must also change their current practices in order to bring about this 
change.  Major changes in the alignment of federal and provincial ministries in their 
responsibilities and in their relationships with one another are required in order to 
establish a system that supports reforms that will truly reduce crime and disorder in 
Canada.  For example, leadership within the Ministry of the Solicitor General, the 
Ministry of the Attorney General, Health Canada, and the Ministry of Children and 
Families will be necessary.  If the recommendations in the City of Surrey CRS are 
implemented, they will require a restructuring of the justice system in some ways.  
However, it appears that a bottom-up approach is necessary to demonstrate the benefits of 
multi-agency work in order to gain support at a more strategic level.   
The fact that the partnerships and the Crime Reduction Strategy in Surrey are 
being delivered in a bottom-up process opposed to a federally legislated top-down 
approach might prove to be more effective in the long-run.  The U.K.’s top-down crime 
reduction model approach involved a significant amount of funding and new legislation 
and was led by a higher level of government.  The large-scale nature of the U.K. model 
has been described as possibly contributing to some of the difficulties encountered at the 
local level.  These challenges were outlined earlier in the paper:  (1) information and 
resource sharing, (2) accountability, (3) local partnerships, (4) roles and responsibilities, 
and (5) value conflicts and power differentials.  British Columbia is starting off slower 
and smaller through detachment commanders and city officials at the municipal level 
which might be a more appropriate way of unfolding crime reduction strategies since 
crime issues need to be understood at the ground level in their local contexts.  However, 
while it seems to make sense that municipalities decide on their own crime reduction 
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strategies in order for them to be specific to their criminal justice environment and 
community, it can also be viewed as a government tactic to shift responsibility to others.  
As a result, the government is not directly blamed for any failures. 
Police agencies have had to employ an array of responsibilization strategies in 
order to effectively deal with allotted resources, demands from the public, and political 
changes within the government.  It is no longer possible for the government to solely and 
properly govern all members of society.  Society is too culturally and politically diverse 
for population management to take place in democratic countries.  Also, it would be 
difficult to try to remove the power from the public that the government has gradually 
delegated to them over the past thirty to forty years.  The future is likely to continue with 
the government ‘steering’ and employing responsibilization strategies while allowing 
other control providers to do the ‘rowing’. 
The City of Surrey and the police are aware of the limitations of the justice 
system in preventing and deterring crime as well as the breakdown of society.  The Crime 
Reduction Strategy is an attempt to change its service delivery through partnerships and 
more effective tactics.  Over the past forty years policing went from traditional reactive 
policing and command and control to crime prevention and community-based policing 
(Garland 1996; 2000).  Crime reduction strategies might represent the next paradigm shift 
in policing governance and act as a revolutionary change, or alternatively, they might 
simply be a change in emphasis along the continuum of crime control.  Crime reduction 
strategies, based on partnerships represent a balanced approach to governing crime. 
Partnerships play an important part in recent trends and developments in the local 
governance of crime and personal security.  The City of Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy 
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emphasizes the notion that there is a collective duty within society to tackle crime and to 
embed crime prevention into all occupations.      
c. Governance Issues 
 
While the responsibilization of non-state agencies through multi-agency 
partnerships has the advantage of having more watchers, Garland (1996) reminds us that 
implementing social and situational forms of crime prevention involve the reordering of 
conduct in the everyday life of the public and some members of the public are not ready 
for such changes.  The challenges of roles and responsibilities, power differentials, and 
accountability structures in building partnerships, show that there are limitations in 
maintaining them.   
This raises questions about how the City of Surrey will address roles and 
responsibilities, power differentials, accountability structures, and information sharing 
protocol issues that are so vital to partnerships in its crime reduction strategy.  Many 
obstacles and delays in the delivery of crime reduction strategies occur as a result of 
problems within partnerships.  The United Kingdom ran into several partnership 
problems during its Crime Reduction Program.  The City of Surrey will have to address 
problems in implementing a Crime Reduction Strategy. 
Governments have found a way to be more involved in crime issues at the local 
level but have they offloaded too much of the responsibility for crime reduction to their 
partners.  While the U.K. claims to devolve the decision making powers and details of 
crime reduction strategies to the local level, in reality the Home Office still has control of 
the process by ensuring performance targets, performance indicators, assessments, 
evaluations, and legislated partnerships are in place.  This can be considered an effective 
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oversight mechanism because of the failures and ineffectiveness of crime prevention 
programs and initiatives in the past.  Also, the U.K. Home Office invested a great deal of 
money into their crime reduction work; therefore, they could not risk leaving it all in the 
hands of practitioners or partners at the local level.  The government in the United 
Kingdom found a way to become more involved at the local level where the ground work 
takes place.   
 Through an elaborate level of partnership work demonstrated in the U.K. along 
with what Surrey is similarly trying to implement, “boundary blurring” (Crawford 1998b; 
Harris, 2003) seems to automatically take place between agencies and organizations 
especially if roles and responsibilities have not been clearly defined.  Multi-agency work 
on initiatives causes confusion as to who is responsible for the outcomes if they are not 
successful.  For example, partnerships between the police and education departments can 
become difficult when parties within the partnership are not completely clear about one 
another’s roles.  In addition, it causes confusion for the people accessing the services.  
Also, the wrap-around strategy which ensures offenders receive treatment and aftercare 
throughout their time in the Criminal Justice System and afterwards requires very close 
work and information sharing between many agencies and organizations.  Due to the 
sophistication of such a strategy, the roles and responsibilities of agencies can easily 
become blurred.  If an offender falls through the cracks, will the blame fall on the police, 
drug treatment workers, probation, housing, or another agency?  This raises the issue of 
whether the blame can be shared, and if so, what does this really mean.  Boundary 
blurring can be described as a governance tactic because it seems to be a form of 
offloading by the Criminal Justice System.  For instance, even though the municipal 
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levels of government are involved in crime reduction strategies and have one of the lead 
roles, they are outnumbered by the amount of private, non-profit, and other government 
agencies involved in the crime reduction strategies.   
 The creation of new roles such as community safety managers, community safety 
officers, traffic wardens, and neighbourhood wardens, are all examples of the sharing of 
work that was once considered to be the sole responsibility of the police.  Also, the 
dispersal of the appearance of more watchers by means of similar uniforms is present. 
This has resulted in the pluralizing of policing and government regulation.  Some of these 
positions report to the local authorities, rather than only to the police.  In the future, areas 
of crime control that fall under the responsibility of these new roles will be less and less 
perceived as duties falling within police jurisdiction.  It would be difficult for the police 
to ever get their power and responsibility back once it has been dispersed across several 
new roles under different supervision.  On the other hand, this form of two-tiered 
policing, where the police deal with more complex crime issues and devolve the less 
complex duties to other auspices may serve to be more efficient and effective in terms of 
resources, public satisfaction, and outcomes.   
 The police often dominate meetings, agendas, and strategies (Gilling, 1993; 
Harris, 2003; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Millie and Erol, 2006; Phillips et al., 2002; 
Rogers, 2006); however, a consideration is whether initiatives would actually get off the 
ground without their lead.  While the police may not be considered the sole experts on 
crime issues anymore, they certainly still have the knowledge of what has worked and not 
worked in the past and what is feasible with existing resources.  Also, some major 
initiatives, such as the programs and teams created to deal with prolific offenders, require 
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the police to take a lead role while engaging other partners in the process.  The City of 
Surrey CRS provides some focus for agency roles by dividing the goal of tackling crime 
into four strands.  These four strands have specific strategies and involve the specifics of 
how partners will need to participate in order to successfully reach the objectives of the 
overall strategy.  The U.K. Prolific and Priority Offender scheme had similar strands in 
effect.   
In summary, partnerships will experience many challenges in multi-agency work.  
These challenges are differences in government structure, legislation, implementation and 
delivery of a crime reduction model, governance issues surrounding accountability 
systems, blurring boundaries, and the offloading of responsibilities.  Being aware of such 
obstacles from the onset and putting systems in place to deal with these issues may be the 
only feasible option when setting up successful crime reduction partnerships and 
strategies. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
 
 Multi-agency partnerships are on the rise as a result of the limitations of the 
Criminal Justice System in many democratic countries.  It is evident that these 
partnership approaches have become the current trend in governance as more countries 
develop crime reduction strategies which entail strong partnership components.  There 
are two dominant views regarding the intentions of the government in encouraging multi-
agency partnership work at the local level.  First, the government is becoming more 
involved at the local level by way of devolving decision-making authority to city officials 
and the police.  The reasons presented for this view include the fact that audits, targets, 
and performance indicators are part of the U.K. crime reduction model at the local level 
which are systems that are monitored and evaluated by a higher level of government.  
Second, these partnerships are simply another government technique to offload 
responsibility on to others in an effort to no longer be held responsible for failures of the 
welfare of the population and society.   
While it is apparent that all emerging methods for dealing with crime issues will 
have obstacles, it appears that difficulties within partnerships themselves serve as the 
primary obstacle in crime reduction work.  These obstacles include information sharing, 
accountability systems, roles and responsibilities, value conflicts, and power differentials.  
In addition, other factors to take into consideration while adapting a model being used 
elsewhere are differences in government structures, legislation, and delivery of a crime 
reduction strategy, such as who the stakeholders and partners will be, who will create and 
implement the strategy, and who will lead the initiative. 
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The lack of evidence-based literature on Canadian public safety initiatives along 
with the non-existent crime reduction literature in our country calls for practical research 
to be done in this area.  It would be useful to see what the views of the multi-agency 
partnership approach are from partners apart from the police and city officials once the 
delivery of the strategies are underway.  This analysis could be conducted through 
surveys and interviews.  Also, while it is beyond the scope of this paper to cover all of the 
conflict issues that arise in multi-agency partnerships, it would be useful to cover 
additional themes as well as examine the themes presented in this paper in further depth.  
Other themes include decision-making processes, overcoming communication barriers, 
and ensuring a sufficient amount of time to develop relationships before forming 
partnerships.  Another important theme would be productivity within partnerships.  
Working in partnerships can be labour and time intensive due to frequent meetings to 
discuss projects and progress with the result that participants can feel that they are 
managing a process of working together rather than accomplishing targets and goals. 
Since the City of Surrey is the first Canadian municipality to create a formal 
Crime Reduction Strategy, there is no other available research to draw comparisons from 
in Canada.  While some RCMP detachments are incorporating crime reduction strategies 
into their work, these cannot yet be compared to the detailed and comprehensive strategy 
that the City of Surrey has presented and is beginning to work towards.  If other 
municipalities follow the lead of Surrey, comparisons may be possible in the future.  
Once outcomes and evaluations have taken place for the City of Surrey CRS, it is 
recommended that a review of the partnerships be part of future analysis.  In addition, it 
would be beneficial to evaluate the long-term outcomes of the Crime Reduction Strategy. 
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While the United Kingdom has made substantial progress in reducing crime since 
implementing the crime reduction model in the mid-1990’s, future research examining 
crime reduction partnership literature in other commonwealth countries, such as the 
United States, New Zealand, and Australia, is necessary.  It is likely that partnerships in 
these countries face similar challenges and successes in crime reduction partnership 
work.  Although many areas may have good crime reduction strategies in place there will 
be problems throughout the implementation and delivery stages of the initiatives if the 
issues are not addressed. 
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